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Government Trade Policy and the
Professional Regulation
of Foreign Lawyers
Sydney M. Cone, lI'
This paper discusses United States government trade policy
and the regulation of foreign lawyers. Although the expression
"trade policy" implies a settled course of action adopted and fol-
lowed by the United States government, in the area of legal ser-
vices the formulation of government trade policy has been a rather
fortuitous occurrence. Further, while the term "regulation," partic-
ularly in the context of the legal profession, suggests a recognizable
and ordered system, the rules and procedures for the regulation of
foreign lawyers in various jurisdictions do not fall readily into any
pattern; instead they appear to be quite random.
The regulation of foreign lawyers antedates the emergence of
trade policy in the area of legal services; while the pertinent regu-
lations are rather comprehensive, the trade policy which underlies
them is relatively undeveloped. It therefore seems appropriate to
begin by considering the diverse regulations lawyers encounter in
various jurisdictions when they establish offices outside of their
home countries. This paper will then analyze the effective absence
of U.S. trade policy regarding legal services. Finally, the paper will
discuss the increased priority given to this issue in recent negotia-
tions with Japan. It will conclude by arguing that U.S. governmen-
tal interest in the presence of American lawyers in Japan ought not
portend a decision by the United States to promote legal services
as a "trade issue" other than in the special circumstances of Japan.
I. FOREIGN LAWYER REGULATION
A. General Framework
The "regulation of foreign lawyers" is used here to refer to the
regulation by a host state of lawyers from other jurisdictions who
seek to establish themselves in the host state and to practice there
t Partner, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, New York, N.Y.
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on a regular basis.' To a significant extent, the restrictiveness of
local rules governing foreign lawyers will turn on three factors: the
scope of professional activity reserved exclusively to qualified local
lawyers,' local barriers to and requirements for attaining the status
of lawyer, and local rules governing association between local and
foreign lawyers. These factors are far from uniform in the relevant
jurisdictions of the international community.'
Whatever the local rules, however, lawyers outside their coun-
tries of origin generally do not seek to conduct a courtroom prac-
tice, but limit themselves to legal consultation and advice, includ-
ing the negotiation and preparation of legal documents; for
convenience, this type of practice will be referred to as a "consult-
ing practice."
In some localities, notably the states of the United States, lo-
cally licensed lawyers enjoy a broad monopoly;4 while in other
countries, for example, England-where one might expect to find a
legal system akin to America's-the conduct of a consulting prac-
tice is largely unrestricted.5 In countries of the latter type, foreign
' See Sydney M. Cone, III, The Regulation of Foreign Lawyers 1-2 (3d ed. 1984)
("ABA Study"). This study was published by the Section of International Law and Practice
of the American Bar Association.
' The operative question is how a country defines the "practice of law" which is re-
served for local lawyers. If the definition is narrow, numerous services will fall outside the
scope of what is reserved to a local lawyer, leaving room for entry by foreign lawyers to
perform most activities involved in a consulting practice. A broad definition of the practice
of law, on the other hand, can be a significant barrier to entry by foreign lawyers.
I See generally, ABA Study (cited in note 1); Note, Providing Legal Services in Foreign
Countries: Making Room for the American Attorney, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1767, 1770-87
(1983). Regrettably, this Note is occasionally inaccurate or inconsistent. At pages 1792-93,
for example, it pronounces against foreign lawyers advising on local law, notwithstanding
that the preponderance of the materials it cites (in footnotes 64 and 216-31) supports the
opposite conclusion.
' "In the United States, where the single class of 'lawyer' has the exclusive right to
practice 'law,' powerful state bar associations have influenced the development of a very
broad definition of the practice of law, leaving a very narrow scope of activity for non-
lawyers, including foreign lawyers." Note, Colum. L. Rev. at 1781 (cited in note 3). See also
Geza Feketekuty, Trade in Professional Services: An Overview, 1986 U. Chi. Legal F. 1, 13
(observing that the practice of law is often defined to include foreign law so that a foreign
lawyer is prohibited even from advising on the law of his home country).
"Use of the title 'barrister' or 'solicitor' and a limited number of 'reserved activi-
ties'-principally, rights of audience before the courts, the preparation of certain documents
(namely those transferring land), and the undertaking of probate work-are reserved to
qualified barristers or solicitors. Otherwise, the practice of law in England is not restricted
to qualified English lawyers, nor is there any statutory or other system for licensing foreign
lawyers to practice in England. In consequence, an American lawyer who has obtained the
relevant immigration consent or employment permit to take up residence in England as a
self-employed or employed practitioner is free to practice the law of the United States or
any other jurisdiction, including England, subject only to the above-mentioned matters
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lawyers, while unable to plead in the local courts, can often estab-
lish a consulting practice of substantial scope.
Local barriers and requirements confronting foreign lawyers
are found not only in published rules,' but also in the manner in
which local administrative, judicial and rule-making authorities ex-
ercise their discretion. In West Germany, for example, where the
formal requirements for becoming a Rechtsanwalt (member of the
Bar) are forbidding, 7 the seeming alternative of Rechtsbeistand
(legal consultant) may, in practice, be largely illusory for a for-
eigner.8 In Switzerland, a general government policy requiring a
showing of "need" for the foreign lawyer has also resulted in Amer-
ican lawyers being prevented from establishing consulting practices
there.9 On the other hand, discretion can be used to facilitate the
establishment of law offices abroad: Hong Kong, for example, has
not strictly enforced its limitation on the number of foreign firms
permitted to open offices there.'0
which are reserved to the English profession." ABA Study at 63-64 (cited in note 1).
6 Typical local requirements include: local citizenship, passage of a local examination, a
number of years of education in the country, and practical experience in the country. The
ABA Study describes the requirements imposed by each of the jurisdictions it covers. Even
in countries where legal consultant status is available, foreign lawyers often find themselves
facing substantial barriers in the form of examination and education requirements, limita-
tions on the activities in which they may engage, or regulations which vary among jurisdic-
tions within one country.
See ABA Study at 71 (cited in note 1) (requirements for becoming a Rechtsanwalt
include the successful completion of two arduous and lengthy examinations, a minimum of
three and one-half to five years of study at a university, and two and one-half years of
practical training-a process which takes from seven to nine years). See also Note, 83
Colum. L. Rev. at 1776-77 (cited in note 3).
' Note, 83 Colum. L. Rev. at 1781-82 (cited in note 3). There is no citizenship require-
ment for obtaining a license as a legal consultant (Rechtsbeistand) and "the applicant must
show only professional competence and good character." However, the scope of permissible
activities for the 'legal consultant' is narrowly circumscribed: "[a]n American attorney who
obtained such a license might be restricted to advising on matters of international or Ameri-
can law." Furthermore, a Rechtsbeistand may only advise within the district where he is
admitted, and is subject to any limitation set down by the chief judge of the district court in
that district. ABA Study at 71-72 (cited in note 1). Ian S. Forrester and Hans-Michael Ilgen,
The German Legal System (1972), written expressly for an American readership, does not
even mention the Rechtsbeistand.
I In Switzerland, the government has strictly applied its policy of permitting American
lawyers to work in Switzerland as 'legal advisors' "only if a competent Swiss citizen cannot
be found to fill the same position and the American is considered indispensable to the firm
for which he is employed." Note, 83 Colum. L. Rev. at 1774-75 (cited in note 3).
'0 Guidelines for foreign lawyers seeking to practice in Hong Kong "provide a limit of
two firms from any country, unless the applicant presents 'evidence of a very substantial
demand' for advice on its country's laws." ABA Study at 75 (cited in note 1). But ten Amer-
ican firms had opened branches in Hong Kong by May of 1984. To the author's knowledge,
such showing of substantial demand for advice on American law was not required of all
these firms.
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A related factor is the ease with which a foreign lawyer may
associate with local lawyers in order to be able to carry on a prac-
tice involving local law. While France and Belgium have been rela-
tively welcoming in this respect, the Paris and Brussels Bars forbid
their members (avocats) from associating with foreign law firms,
and require them to resign from the Bar upon accepting employ-
ment or partnership in a foreign law firm.'1 Thus, lawyers in for-
eign law offices in Belgium typically advise on Belgian law only in
their capacity as members of the unregulated profession of conseil-
lers juridiques;12 and in France, subject to rather elaborate rules,
many foreign law firms and lawyers have qualified as members of
the regulated profession of conseils juridiques, but not as full-
fledged members of the Bar."3
Foreign law firms have tended to establish offices in four of
the jurisdictions referred to above-Belgium, England, France and
Hong Kong-for essentially two reasons. First, each includes a ma-
jor city where businessmen or bankers find it logical to consult
lawyers. Second, each has permissive local rules regulating the con-
duct of an international consulting practice. The emergence of
these cities as international legal centers has been a product of his-
torical accident and commercial convenience: a matter of foreign
lawyers discovering whither they can follow their clients and of lo-
cal authorities acknowledging the regulatory lacunae in which the
foreign lawyers' consulting practices can be made to fit. While the
local Bars have not always been enthusiastic about the presence of
foreign lawyers, the local governments have typically been loath to
disturb foreign professionals whose activities have facilitated prof-
itable trade and investment."'
" To the author's knowledge, this prohibition has been applied in all instances in
which an American law firm employed an avocat in Paris or Brussels. The regulations of the
Brussels Bar have recently become more liberal in this regard, and permit foreigners to
associate with Brussels firms of avocats. Reglement d'Ordre Interieur de l'Ordre des Avocats
du Barreau de Bruxelles, arts. 69-79 (1984). See ABA Study at 48 (cited in note 1). A paral-
lel liberalization is found in French Decree No. 85-1123 of October 22, 1985, [1985] Journal
Officiel de la Republique Francaise 12255 (October 23, 1985).
" "The profession of conseillers juridiques is not formally organized or subject to legal
regulation and may be practiced by all Belgians as well as by non-Belgians who have been
authorized to reside and work in Belgium." ABA Study at 47-48 (cited in note 1). Conseil-
lers Juridiques are entitled to give legal advice, but may not practice before Belgian courts
of general jurisdiction.
,1 See id. at 68-70; see also Sydney M. Cone, III, Foreign Lawyers in France and New
York, 9 Int'l Law. 465, 466-68 (1975).
" In the debate on 1971 French legislation according rights to foreign lawyers, Rene
Pleven, the Minister of Justice, emphasized the importance of attracting foreign lawyers:
"[W]e have the ambition of developing Paris as a major legal center.... That will attract to
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Lack of regulation or narrow definitions of the practice of law
have sometimes sufficed to enable foreign lawyers to establish con-
sulting practices. 5 In other cases, more than official tolerance has
been required in order to permit foreign law firms to establish of-
fices out of which they can conduct a consulting practice. The mo-
nopoly of the legal profession in the United States is so broad that
in 1974, New York, desiring to enhance its status as a leading in-
ternational center, had to enact special legislation and adopt a spe-
cial set of rules in order to provide for the licensing of legal consul-
tants from foreign countries without subjecting applicants to the
bar examination." These rules for licensing without examination
were authorized by a decisive majority of the New York legisla-
ture. 17 The large number of licenses issued under the rules, with a
single license often representing a significant office of a foreign law
firm, suggests that the rules have been serving the purpose sought
by the New York legislature. 18
B. Reciprocity; Applicable Law
Although the foregoing illustrations set out the general frame-
work of foreign lawyer regulation, 9 proceeding to an analysis of
American policy on trade as it affects legal services requires that
two specific regulatory issues be discussed: the problems of reci-
procity and of applicable law.
The issue of reciprocity seems to arise almost as a natural re-
flex: why should country A allow lawyers from country B to estab-
our country many activities which could very easily be moved elsewhere.... [This policy] is
very important for our country." [1971] Journal Officiel de Ia Republique Francaise 4587
(October 14, 1971) (author's translation).
" Before 1972, legal counseling was an unregulated profession in France. Cone, 9 Int'l
Law. at 465 (cited in note 13). The French definition of the practice of law did not include
the giving of advice on any law, including French law. This narrow definition enabled nu-
merous American firms to open offices in France. Id. at 466.
," Act of April 23, 1974, ch. 231, 1974 N.Y. Laws 999 (adding N.Y. Jud. Law § 53(6));
N.Y. Admin. Code tit. 22, § 521 (1985) (Rules of the N.Y. Court of Appeals for the Licensing
of Legal Consultants). See ABA Study at 30-31 (cited in note 1); Cone, 9 Int'l Law. at 469-
71 (cited in note 13).
" The New York Senate and Assembly approved the statute by votes of 41-15 and
130-10 respectively.
18 See ABA Study at 31 (cited in note 1) ("As of February 1984, some seventy legal
consultants had been licensed pursuant to the applicable rules."). To the author's knowl-
edge, this number went above ninety as of September 1986.
" For detailed descriptions of all major jurisdictions' regulations concerning foreign
lawyers, see ABA Study (cited in note 1) and Note, 83 Colum. L. Rev. at 1767 (cited in note
3).
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lish offices in A if B does not reciprocate? 0 The meaning and en-
forceability of reciprocity seem to be called into question, however,
by the fact that several major jurisdictions have avoided the reflex:
Belgium, England, Hong Kong and New York have never adopted
reciprocity requirements, although they have permitted the local
establishment of large numbers of foreign law firms.2 In addition,
the French government has never invoked its reciprocity require-
ment during the ten years since its inception.
Because legal systems generally, and the regulation of the legal
profession in particular, vary so widely from country to country,
what would constitute reciprocity as between any two jurisdictions
is rarely self-evident. Moreover, enforcing reciprocity would mean
obtaining affirmative evidence on the availability of reciprocal
treatment, an issue that is likely to involve difficult questions. If
the United States is being judged, for example, what weight does
one give the relative ease with which many foreigners have gained
full-fledged admission to the Bar in some, but not all, American
" Chief Justice Burger had this reflex in his dissent in In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717
(1973). The majority in that case ruled that, under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause, a state may not deny admission to the Bar solely on grounds of citizen-
ship. The Chief Justice, dissenting, said that "[since the Court now strikes down a power of
the States accepted as fundamental since 1787, even if States sometimes elected not to exer-
cise it, . . . the States may well move to adopt ... a reciprocal proviso ... under [which] a
state would admit to the practice of law the nationals of such other countries as admit
American citizens to practice." 413 U.S. at 733 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
When France codified the status of foreign lawyers in 1971, a reciprocity provision was
included, specifying that beginning in 1977, if registered foreign law firms were neither from
other European Community countries nor from nations according reciprocal treatment to
French lawyers, the French government would have discretionary authority to limit their
activities to a legal counseling practice involving principally foreign and international law.
French Law No. 71-1130 of Dec. 31, 1971, especially Title II, Ch. I of the Law; Title IV, Ch.
I, § 111 of Decree No. 72-670 of July 13, 1972. See generally Professions Judiciaires et
Juridiques-Reforme, Brochure No. 1388, Journaux Officiels (1983).
1, A proposed California Rule of Court concerning registered foreign legal consultants,
recommended by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of California, also contains no
requirement of reciprocity. Proposed Rule 988, Registered Foreign Legal Consultants (Au-
gust 23, 1986) ("California Proposal") (copy on file with the University of Chicago Legal
Forum). Similarly, a proposal for amending the Illinois rules governing admission of foreign
lawyers also rejects reciprocity requirements, because of the restrictive standards already
embodied in the rules and because "application by the State of Illinois of a law that is in the
public interest should not be made to depend upon the action of the authorities of a foreign
country." Petition for the Adoption of Supreme Court Rules Relating to the Licensing of
Foreign Legal Consultants, No. 3552, in the Supreme Court of Illinois (March 1, 1985) ("Illi-
nois Petition").
" Although this reciprocity requirement was directed at American law firms, see [1971]
Journal Officiel de Ia Republique Francaise 6595 (December 9, 1971), the French govern-
ment has never indicated an intention to make use of its discretionary authority to limit
American law firms in France in this manner.
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jurisdictions? What difference should it make that the nation's
principal commercial legal center, New York, treats foreign lawyers
quite liberally, but that they are treated less liberally in certain
other American jurisdictions?
Attempting to focus inquiry into reciprocity in order to make
it a functional concept, rules recently adopted in the District of
Columbia, Hawaii and Michigan for the licensing of legal consul-
tants without a bar examination try to come to grips with some of
the problems inherent in a reciprocity requirement. Under these
rules, a court evaluating an application for a license would have
discretion to consider whether, in the applicant's home country, a
D.C. or Hawaii or Michigan lawyer would have a reasonable and
practical opportunity to establish an office for the giving of legal
advice. Yet the court would have this discretionary authority only
if there was pending with the court a request, from a member of
the D.C. or Hawaii or Michigan Bar actively seeking to establish
such an office in that foreign country, to take this factor into ac-
count, and then only if the request raised a serious question as to
the adequacy of the opportunity for the D.C. or Hawaii or Michi-
gan lawyer to establish such an office.23
At least as vexing as reciprocity is the subject of applicable
law, a subject which arises in two related ways. First, if a lawyer is
advising on a transaction, his advice will depend upon the law gov-
erning the transaction. Second, if he is carrying out a consulting
practice while established in a foreign jurisdiction, he may be pro-
hibited from advising on the law of that jurisdiction. To the extent
that exogenous forces require that the law of a particular jurisdic-
tion govern certain transactions, a local restriction preventing for-
eign lawyers from advising on that law will effectively prevent
them from working on those transactions even though the Bar
rules permit them to advise on other law.
Although the proper law for a transaction will sometimes be
self-evident, a choice can frequently be made; indeed, the legal
principles governing a transaction will often be the same no matter
what law is selected to govern it. But jurisprudential considera-
tions do not always determine the selection of applicable law even
D.C. Ct. App. Rule 46(c)(4)(C) (1986) ("D.C. Rule"); Hawaii S. Ct. Rule 14.2(d)
(1986) ("Hawaii Rule"); Michigan Board of Law Examiners Rule 5(E) (1985) ("Michigan
Rule").
The Office of the United States Trade Representative has suggested that the Japanese
Government use the reciprocity provision in the D.C. Rule as a model for Japan. Office of
the United States Trade Representative, USTR Statement on Foreign Lawyers in Japan
(December 17, 1985) (copy on file with the University of Chicago Legal Forum).
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when the choice of law does in fact matter. Governmental agencies
and other interest groups may attempt to influence the choice of
law for certain types of transactions, either generally or on an ad
hoc basis. While it might seem sensible to select the lawyers and
the geographical legal center for a transaction after the applicable
law has been determined, the opposite may occur: applicable law
may sometimes be a function of the choice of lawyers and geo-
graphical legal center. The politics of international legal centers is
therefore not without its struggles over applicable law: if one law is
chosen, one type of lawyer or legal center will be used; if a differ-
ent law is chosen, a different type of lawyer or legal center will be
used.
Not surprisingly, then, local Bars have a tendency to argue
that a consulting practice, insofar as it relates to local law, should
be reserved to members of the local Bar.24 Much ink has been spilt
both advocating and criticizing this position. Proponents of such
restrictions argue the risk to local citizens of unreliable advice
given by foreign lawyers not well versed in local law, as well as the
risk to the local Bar of losing business to foreign competition. 5
Critics of such limitations argue that lawyers must be able to ad-
vise their clients on the totality of their transactional problems,
and not just on such portions of those problems as are governed by
a particular foreign law; and that "[tihe interweaving of [the laws
of different jurisdictions pertinent to an international transaction]
makes it difficult for a foreign lawyer to give the best advice unless
he is able to give advice on the total legal situation. '26 While repre-
sentatives of a local Bar can wax prolix if not eloquent on the need
24 See Note, 83 Colum. L. Rev. at 1788-93 (cited in note 3).
Id. at 1806-08.
2 Id. at 1792 n. 130, quoting testimony of J. Eugene Marans, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen &
Hamilton, at a District of Columbia Bar panel discussion on international law practice. See
also the Statement by Francis T. P. Plimpton on Proposed New York Rule for the Licensing
of Legal Consultants as transmitted by the Clerk of the New York Court of Appeals, Febru-
ary 16, 1973 at 2-3 (copy on file with the University of Chicago Legal Forum):
[Allthough it would be neither practicable nor in the interest of the client to limit any
lawyer to advising on the law of his own jurisdiction, the proposed rule would not per-
mit licensed legal consultants to render legal advice on the law of New York or of the
United States except on the basis of advice from a person duly qualified and entitled
(other than by virtue of the proposed new rule) to render professional legal advice in
New York on such law. Thus, licensed legal consultants would in the normal course
seek the advice of New York lawyers on questions of New York and United States law
and practice, including such areas as American administrative law and Federal and
State taxation. The proposed rule does not restrict the practice by consultant[s] before
administrative tribunal[s] since they can and do determine their own standards of
admission.
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to protect the public from foreigners, this sentiment has not always
been shared by the public itself, because the opening up of the
local market enables citizens to obtain a wider range of services at
lower cost, or by local governments, because they value the new
business which foreign lawyers often bring into the country.17
Several jurisdictions have relatively liberal laws allowing for-
eign lawyers to engage in a consulting practice involving local law.
France actually licenses foreigners as conseils juridiques author-
ized to carry on a consulting practice in French law.28 Legal consul-
tants licensed in New York are authorized to advise their clients
on a broad range of New York and federal law, provided their ad-
vice is based on advice given them by members of the Bar.29 In the
District of Columbia, a licensed legal consultant is permitted to
give advice on District of Columbia law, federal law, or the law of
any state of the United States, on the basis of advice from a mem-
ber of the Bar "who has been consulted in the particular matter at
hand and has been identified to the client by name. ' 30
Representing a sharp departure from these approaches are the
recently adopted Michigan Rule, as well as the pending California
Proposal. The Michigan Rule authorizes a licensed special legal
consultant only to "render professional legal advice [in Michigan]
on the law of the foreign country where the legal consultant is ad-
mitted to practice." 1 The intent of the Michigan Rule is unclear,
however; it was adopted on the basis of "memoranda of the Court
staff [which] are confidential." ' 2 Unlike the New York rules, which
authorize legal consultants to "render legal services,"33 the Michi-
'7 See, for example, the remarks of Rene Pleven, the French Minister of Justice,
quoted in note 14. Pleven argued that transforming Paris into an international legal center
was wise because it would attract many other important "activities" to France. [1971] Jour-
nal Officiel de la Republique Francaise 4587 (October 14, 1971) (author's translation). Simi-
larly, Governor Thompson of Illinois has urged the adoption of Bar rules in his state ena-
bling foreign lawyers to engage in a variety of activities in Illinois, arguing that such rules
"would encourage foreign investment in our state." Letter of Gov. James R. Thompson to
Hon. Joseph H. Goldenhersh (May 7, 1985), reprinted in Illinois Petition, at Exhibit D
(cited in note 21).
28 See ABA Study at 69-70 (cited in note 1); Cone, 9 Int'l Law. at 468 (cited in note
13).
' N.Y. Admin. Code tit. 22, § 521.3 (1985).
30 D.C. Ct. App. Rule 46(c)(4)(D)(5).
" Michigan Board of Law Examiners Rule 5(E)(d)(1). The California Proposal, at Rule
988(o)(5) (cited in note 21), would similarly limit the practice of Foreign Legal Consultants.
See note 80.
3' Letter from Michigan State Board of Law Examiners to J. Eugene Marans, Cleary,
Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton (Dec. 5, 1985) (copy on file with the University of Chicago Legal
Forum).
11 N.Y. Admin. Code tit. 22, § 521.3 (1985).
169]
178 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
gan Rule speaks only of rendering "advice" confined to the laws of
the legal consultant's "foreign country." Presumably, "advice" will
be given a suitable interpretation to allow the Michigan legal con-
sultant to negotiate and draft legal documents.
The Michigan Rule and the California Proposal (if adopted)
will test the contention "that limiting the scope of practice to the
law of the lawyer's own country discourages him from setting up a
foreign office." 34
II. U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY AND LEGAL SERVICES
A. The Legal Profession: An Atypical Service Industry
For purposes of United States government trade policy, the
legal profession is classed as a "service industry." 3 As such, how-
ever, it is an oddity, composed principally of private partnerships
of individual legal practitioners. Fortune magazine does not men-
tion the legal profession in its report on the "Service 500" for
1985,36 nor would the profession fit in any of Fortune's eight cate-
gories for service industries (commercial banking, insurance, sav-
ings institutions, diversified financial companies, diversified service
companies, transportation, utilities and retailing). A ninth category
would have to be added, in part because rules applicable to the
legal profession would probably prevent a law firm from acquiring
or being acquired by a "diversified service company" and thus
coming within that category. It seems questionable whether such a
ninth category (including and potentially dominated by account-
ants) could measure up to the other eight: even though law firms
do not publish their financial results, journalistic data (which seem
unlikely to be understated) suggest that the revenues of law firms
do not approach the revenues of Fortune's service companies.3 "
Analysis of data for international trade in services suggests
34 Note, 83 Colum. L. Rev. at 1792 (cited in note 3).
11 See U.S. National Study on Trade in Services, A Submission by the United States
Government to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1984) ("U.S. Study"). See also
John H. Barton, Negotiation Patterns for Liberalizing International Trade in Professional
Services, 1986 U. Chi. Legal F. 97.
6 The Fortune Service 500: Directory of the Largest U.S. Non-Industrial Corporations,
Fortune 113, 122-41 (June 9, 1986).
" The American Lawyer shows "America's Seventy-Five Highest-Grossing [Law]
Firms" to have had fiscal 1985 and 1986 gross revenues in the range of $39 million to $169
million. Am. Law. 37-71 (July/August, 1986). The ranking of Fortune's "Service 500" for
1985 is by billions of dollars of sales (two categories), operating revenues (one category), or
assets (five categories). The Fortune Service 500: Directory of the Largest U.S. Non-Indus-
trial Corporations, Fortune 175 (June 10, 1985).
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that law firms are at the lowest end of the spectrum in terms of the
relative importance of their "sales outside the United States." Of
the $27.83 billion of "gross receipts" attributed to the United
States "legal service industry" in 1980, $278 million, or not more
than one percent, is attributed to "gross receipts from foreign op-
erations." ' Because this statistic includes only gross receipts, it
seems unlikely that even one-third of one percent of the gross re-
ceipts of the U.S. "legal service industry" represents income
earned abroad and repatriated to the United States: not only must
law offices pay rent, salaries to lawyers who are not partners and
other expenses of operation, but partners residing abroad can also
be expected to keep and spend much of their income abroad.
Therefore, while it seems fairly certain that the United States does
not run a deficit in "trade" in legal services, it also seems clear that
the relevant "net trade balance" in legal services, as set out in any
table showing U.S. balance of payments data in billions of dollars,
will always be to the right of the decimal point.
It is true that legal services have an impact on important as-
pects of the balance of trade: lawyers assist and advise clients en-
gaging in overseas investment and trade in goods and non-legal
services, and these activities of their clients weigh heavily indeed
in the balance of trade. Lawyers have a wide variety of foreign and
domestic clients, and the net effect of their clients' total activities
on the balance of trade at any time will not be predictable; nor will
it necessarily be favorable to the "net trade balance" of the United
States. No one knows or is likely to know whether, in a given year,
the American legal profession engaged in activities that, when ag-
gregated, had the net effect of increasing or decreasing the overall
American balance of trade.
Moreover, if one reads diligently the literature on negotiating
on trade in services, one can read entire articles that contain not a
word that seems pertinent to "trade in legal services."3 9 The few
statements that seem applicable to the legal profession underline
that the profession is not a subject of "trade."'40
38 Jonathan David Aronson and Peter F. Cowhey, Trade in Services: A Case for Open
Markets 9 (1984).
39 See, for example, Michael C. Aho and Jonathan David Aronson,
Trade Talks: America Better Listen! (1985); Joan Spero, Trade in Services: Removing Barri-
ers, 16 PS 17 (1983), listing as the important service industries for international trade nego-
tiations "such industries as banking, insurance, communications, data processing, engineer-
ing and shipping."
'0 "Trade ministers in many countries do not have the competence or authority to ne-
gotiate in service industries because other agencies regulate these sectors .... To compound
169]
180 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
B. Government Passivity
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the United States
has not developed a general policy toward international "transac-
tions" in legal services. In fact, the U.S. quite explicitly refused to
develop such a policy in the 1984 U.S. National Study on Trade in
Services ("U.S. Study"), submitted to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade: "the United States feels that it is unlikely that
a general approach to visa or professional practice problems would
be either feasible or desirable over the foreseeable future."'4'
This absence of a federal policy has a number of significant
manifestations. To begin with, there is no federal policy with re-
spect to what rules the individual states of the United States
should adopt to govern foreign lawyers.42 In addition, the United
States has completely refrained from intervening, even in its own
hemisphere, to try to curb the flagrantly discriminatory rules that
frustrate the opening of offices by American law firms in such
countries as Canada, Mexico and Brazil.' In matters affecting le-
gal services in Europe, the United States government has not in-
volved the United States Trade Representative or other agencies
responsible for trade issues as such, and instead has confined its
involvement to infrequent intervention by the State Department
and local embassies to defend American law offices that have al-
ready been established abroad.4 The U.S. Study is helpful in ex-
the problems, modern technology is rapidly transforming many of these sectors and it is
difficult to separate the trade and investment aspects of services transactions." Aho and
Aronson, Trade Talks at 43 (cited in note 39).
41 U.S. Study at 39 (cited in note 35).
41 In deference to the jurisdiction of the several states over the Bar in each state, the
Federal government has left the initiative with the Supreme Court of Illinois as regards the
Illinois Petition (cited in note 21), with the Supreme Court of Michigan as regards the
Michigan Rule (cited in note 23); and with the respective local proponents of the California
Proposal (cited in note 21), the Hawaii Rule (cited in note 23), and (in its own backyard)
the D.C. Rule (cited in note 23).
" See ABA Study at 53, 91, and 49 (cited in note 1) for discussion of these discrimina-
tory rules.
" It should be emphasized that the United States government has on occasion been
remarkably effective in protecting acquired rights. For example, on March 7, 1974, the U.S.
Embassy in Brussels sent the Belgian government an Aide-Memoire expressing "disappoint-
ment in learning that the professional cards of many American legal counselors ('conseillers
juridiques') residing in Belgium have . . . been subjected . . . to a number of conditions
which would make it impractical for them to continue to practice their profession in
Belgium." The Aide-Memoire invoked the applicable Treaty of Friendship, Establishment
and Navigation, and stated "we must protest the measures" proposed by the Belgian Minis-
try of the Middle Classes. Embassy of the United States, Aide-Memoire, Brussels (March 7,
1974) (copy on file with the University of Chicago Legal Forum). The proposed measures
were subsequently withdrawn.
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plaining why the United States government has not considered the
many American law firms in Europe to present trade issues:
A still different issue arises in the context of professional ser-
vices, in particular professional services that require a local
presence. The sale of professional services which are to be
provided locally is not a trade issue as such, while the sale of
professional services produced outside the importing country
is clearly a trade issue. . . . [F]oreign suppliers of services
given access to the local market under trade rules would have
the right to contract with fully accredited local professionals
to deliver the service. In other words, local professionals, as
local businessmen, could have the right under trade rules to
buy expertise, [or] support services from a foreign firm. Issues
concerning a foreign-owned professional practice or the ad-
mission of foreign professionals to a domestic practice would
not be covered by international trade rules."5
Yet the U.S. Study does not ignore the fact that governments
have erected barriers to trade in legal services, and it discusses
three barriers in particular which have hindered "foreign lawyers
[seeking] to establish themselves in major cities throughout the
world." '46 First, most countries subject foreign lawyers "to exactly
the same regulations and qualifications as nationals involved in do-
mestic legal practice. Most problems in this regard center around
admission to the bar .... In most countries, one cannot take the
bar examination without being a citizen. ' '4 7 Second, although "legal
adviser status would, in fact, satisfy the needs of most foreign law-
yers who are only seeking to provide direct legal consultation ...
the requirements for legal adviser in most nations are very difficult
to meet."4 8 Finally, in some countries, "[local attorneys are not
normally permitted to work for, or under, foreign attorneys, nor
are foreign lawyers allowed to become partners in local firms."",
The U.S. Study neglects to point out that, when evaluated in
terms of these three impediments, the United States is a paradigm
of liberality: citizenship is not a requirement for taking an Ameri-
can bar examination; in this country's principal legal center, at-
taining legal consultant status has not proved "very difficult," and
" U.S. Study at 38 (cited in note 35).
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legal consultants are free to associate with, or to employ, members
of the Bar.50 Instead, the U.S. Study discussion of trade in legal
services concludes rather passively that "[g]overnments have [a]
legitimate interest in strictly regulating who may provide legal ser-
vices and in determining their qualifications, but may also carry a
bias against foreigners.''51
The U.S. Study begins its discussion of legal services in the
United States with generalizations about various requirements for
admission to the Bars of the states and the District of Columbia.
After noting that the 1973 Griffiths decision prevents states from
requiring U.S. citizenship for admission to their bars,52 the U.S.
Study refers to the adoption by "[olne state, New York, in 1974"
of rules for licensing legal consultants without examination." This
modest entry is the source of a self-inflicted wound, for it officially
endorses and therefore strengthens the argument that the United
States is universally hostile to foreign lawyers, "with New York as
the only exception." ' The U.S. Study fails to recognize that inter-
national competition in legal services takes place between interna-
tional legal centers, of which there are but a few and of which New
York is quite probably the most important.
As a "vehicle for exchanging points of view ... meant to stim-
ulate international discussion, ' 55 the U.S. Study might have noted
that, in the context of competing legal centers, New York is not
merely "one state" (for that matter, foreign lawyers are mainly in-
terested in New York not as "one state" but as one borough), but
is the most important single place in the United States for foreign
lawyers to find liberal rules under which to be licensed. Indeed, the
United States government might have put New York forward as a
reason for according liberal treatment to American service indus-
tries abroad.
Nevertheless, advocates of a more robust governmental atti-
tude toward eliminating "impediments to trade in legal services"
must recognize that the American Bar is far from united behind an
activist governmental policy to this end.56 Diverse attitudes be-
10 ABA Study at 31 (cited in note 1); Cone, 9 Int'l Law. at 471 (cited in note 13).
U.S. Study at 148 (cited in note 35).
" Id. at 32-33. Griffiths is discussed in note 20.
83 Id. at 33. Not mentioned are the Massachusetts and New York rules allowing admis-
sion to the Bar without examination of certain foreigners who have practiced in "English
Common Law" jurisdictions. See Note, 83 Colum. L. Rev. at 1786 n. 107 (cited in note 3).
5' Note, 83 Colum. L. Rev. at 1786 (cited in note 3).
U.S. Study at 1 (cited in note 35).
'6 In 1977, for example, representatives of a Washington D.C. law firm, breaking ranks
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come critical when the United States government is contemplating
an affirmative policy that would promote "trade" in legal services,
i.e., the activities of American lawyers established abroad. The
U.S. must consider whether foreign governments will find it feasi-
ble to influence their own legal practitioners to refrain from frus-
trating the efforts of American law firms seeking to establish offices
in their jurisdictions. The opposition of certain American law firms
to the establishment of foreign law offices in places like Chicago
makes the U.S. government less willing to adopt such an affirma-
tive policy, because it realizes that such opposition will be ammu-
nition in the hands of foreign lawyers who object to the opening of
their jurisdictions to American lawyers.
C. Japan: A Unique Government Initiative?
Despite this absence of a general federal policy, the U.S. Gov-
ernment (in particular, the United States Trade Representative)
has, in one instance, affirmatively deemed transactions in legal ser-
vices to constitute a "trade" issue: in the context of bilateral trade
negotiations with Japan.
with other D.C. firms, wrote a letter to the Chief Judge of the D.C. Court of Appeals oppos-
ing the predecessor proposal for what has since become the D.C. Rule (cited in note 23).
Taking what one commentator has called an "extreme position," this letter argued that for-
eign lawyers should be required to satisfy the same education and certification requirements
as any local lawyer. Note, 83 Colum. L. Rev. at 1796 (cited in note 3) (citing June 3, 1977
letter from Samuel Efron and Robert Neuman to Chief Judge Theodore Newman). This
predecessor proposal was not adopted by the Court, which may have been discouraged by
the opposing letter.
Eight years later, a more dramatic divergence occurred in Illinois. When four partners
in the Chicago law firm of Mayer, Brown & Platt (including a former U.S. Senator and a
former President of the American Bar Association) filed the Illinois Petition on March 1,
1985, urging the Supreme Court of Illinois to adopt rules patterned on the New York legal
consultant rules, four partners in the Chicago firm of Baker & McKenzie filed a Response in
opposition. The Response in turn drew a Reply Memorandum from the four original peti-
tioners. Reply Memorandum in Support of the Petition for Adoption of Supreme Court
Rules Relating to the Licensing of Foreign Legal Consultants, No. 3552, in the Supreme
Court of Illinois (May 17, 1985) (copy on file with the University of Chicago Legal Forum).
The Reply Memorandum stated bluntly that the "Baker & McKenzie Response seeks to
block the adoption of a comprehensive and balanced approach which would obtain for Illi-
nois the benefits of attracting foreign legal consultants to the State," and that the Response
not only mischaracterized the Illinois Petition but also rested on a baseless "floodgates"
argument. Reply Memorandum at 26 and 29. On May 7, 1985, the Governor of Illinois had
written to the Court to "strongly recommend" adoption of the Illinois Petition as a measure
"which would encourage foreign investment in our state." Letter of Gov. James R. Thomp-
son to Hon. Joseph H. Goldenhersh (May 7, 1985), reprinted in Illinois Petition at Exhibit
D (cited in note 21). What impression this row between two major Chicago firms had on the
Court is left to the imagination, for the Illinois Petition was denied without opinion on June
5, 1985.
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Why Japan? Several factors fortuitously converge in the U.S.-
Japanese relationship which make Japan truly unique in the select
arena of international legal centers. These factors can be summa-
rized under the four headings of geography, recent history, bar ad-
mission in Japan, and trade relations with Japan.
1. Geography. Japan is a leading industrial and financial
power located a great distance from any other place that can serve
as an international legal center, and a very great distance from any
place likely to be the situs of regular meetings between major cli-
ents and their lawyers regarding matters involving Japan. Even in
an age of instantaneous transmission of legal documents, there is
no substitute for the face-to-face meeting at which views are ex-
changed, advice is given, negotiations occur, strategies evolve, and
transactions are "structured." Such meetings take place most effi-
ciently if lawyers are located where they can do research, prepare
documents and generally perform the services expected of them,
invariably on a demanding schedule. While such international legal
centers are found in Europe, and the United States can apparently
provide the necessary, legal centers for the Western Hemisphere,
there is no satisfactory extra-Nipponese legal center to serve
Japan.
2. Recent History. From 1949 until 1955, foreign lawyers es-
tablished in Japan were eligible to qualify as legal practitioners
and to join Japanese bar associations as special members,57 and
many foreign lawyers gained such admission during those years.
Since 1955, however, no additional foreign lawyers have been ad-
mitted as legal practitioners. A significant number of American
lawyers (and to a lesser extent English solicitors) have instead es-
tablished themselves in Japan as foreign legal consultants, "train-
ees" and inside corporate house counsel.5 8 And a substantial num-
ber of foreign lawyers regularly visit Japan on professional
business. In addition, in 1977 a partner in the New York law firm
of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy obtained the necessary visa
from the Japanese government and set up a law office in Tokyo. 9
Finally, arguments have been advanced by Japanese scholars that
foreign lawyers are legally entitled to engage in a consulting prac-
17 ABA Study at 84 (cited in note 1).
11 Id. at 85; Note, 83 Colum. L. Rev. at 1807 n. 217 (cited in note 3) ("In Japan, as of
1982, the number of American lawyers in Tokyo was estimated at over one hundred.").
59 ABA Study at 84-85 (cited in note 1); Note, 83 Colum. L. Rev. at 1767 n. 3 (cited in
note 3).
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tice in Japan;60 if these arguments are correct, then the only bar-
rier to establishing additional foreign law offices in Japan is the
political decision by the Japanese government not to issue addi-
tional visas for this purpose.
3. Bar Admission in Japan. The Japanese Bar is highly au-
tonomous and controls access to bar membership; only some 400
new bengoshi (members of the Bar) are admitted annually, fewer
than two percent of Bar applicants.' This restrictive admissions
practice may be one of the reasons why, notwithstanding the exclu-
sion of foreign law firms as such, a considerable number of foreign
lawyers are found in Tokyo.62
4. Trade Relations with Japan. The industrial and financial
strength of Japan has engendered serious and frustrating trade
problems for the United States government. Although the legal
services "industry" is largely peripheral to these trade problems, it
does constitute an activity in which the United States seems to
enjoy a competitive advantage.
These factors may have produced an inherently unstable situ-
ation. They may explain why the pressure to permit foreign law
offices in Japan became so great that the United States govern-
ment decided to treat as a "trade" problem what was essentially a
problem of professional establishment and visa issuance.
As evidenced by discussions between the Nichibenren (the Ja-
pan Federation of Bar Associations) and the American Bar Associ-
ation, as well as protracted negotiations between the Japanese and
United States governments, efforts to convince Japan to grant for-
eign lawyers the right to obtain visas and establish law offices in
Japan became an exception to the policy (discussed above) to
avoid formulating "a general approach to visa or professional prac-
tice problems." 63
60 ABA Study at 85-86 (cited in note 1); Note, 83 Colum, L. Rev. at 1782 n. 84 (cited in
note 3).
1, J. Mark Ramseyer, Japan's Myth of Non-Litigiousness, Nat'l L. J. 13 (July 4, 1983);
Note, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1777 n. 46 (cited in note 3).
61 See generally Note, 83 Colum. L. Rev. at 1807 (cited in note 3); ABA Study at 87
(cited in note 1), discussing the demand for foreign lawyers in Japan.
'3 See text at note 41. The Japanese Bar had been divided for years on the question of
whether foreign law firms should be permitted to establish offices in Japan. See ABA Study
at 86-87 (cited in note 1); Note, 83 Colum. L. Rev. at 1806-07 (cited in note 3). Representa-
tives of the Japanese Bar met with delegates from the American Bar Association for several
days in 1982 and 1984, as well as with European Common Market representatives in 1983,
to gather information on foreign lawyer regulation. See Jurist No. 783 (Tokyo 1983); Note,
83 Colum. L. Rev. at 1813 n. 251 (cited in note 3). In addition, negotiations had been for-
mally initiated between the American and Japanese governments, with the latter regularly
consulting the Japanese Bar. A committee of the Nichibenren had submitted a Report on
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These exceptional efforts were made particularly clear by the
U.S. response to the Nichibenren's adoption, in December 1985, of
a resolution entitled "Approval of the Basic Policy for a 'Foreign
Lawyers' System, for the Smooth and Proper Conduct of Interna-
tional Business. '64 The Office of the United States Trade Repre-
sentative ("USTR") issued a press release denouncing this resolu-
tion and characterizing it as a "marked step backward. 6 5 Arguing
that the proposal gave "little indication that U.S. concerns have
been taken into account,"66 the USTR found the "Nichibenren's
restrictive position on this issue an unacceptable basis for permit-
ting the entry of foreign lawyers into Japan. '6 7
The principal operative portions of the Nichibenren resolution
can be quickly summarized: a qualified foreign lawyer is to be li-
censed by the Japanese Ministry of Justice, without taking the
Japanese bar examination, "to engage in our country [Japan] in
legal business concerning ... the laws of his or her home country
and of any third country designated by the Minister of Justice;"
the licensed foreign lawyer will be prohibited from appearing
before Japanese courts "or other public agencies" and from "em-
ploying" or "jointly operating an office with" a bengoshi; and each
licensed foreign lawyer must register as a "foreign special member"
of Nichibenren, and be placed under its "guidance and
supervision. "6s
These operative provisions subsequently became the basis of
the Japanese Law "Concerning the Handling of Legal Business by
Foreign Lawyers on December 7, 1984, proposing a basis for licensing foreign lawyers to
establish offices in Japan. The Report's proposal was highly restrictive (for example, forbid-
ding licensed foreign lawyers to engage in "legal business where the opposite party is a
resident of our country [Japan) (including a corporation or association with an office in our
country))." Nichibenren Report on Foreign Lawyers § 3.2 (December 7, 1984). In addition,
the first section of this proposal contained a reciprocity requirement, mandating that "a
majority of the [U.S.] states have systems for receiving bengoshi" without examination, as
well as a note stating that "a majority of the states" might become "a substantial number of
the major states." Id. On April 9, 1985, the United States government submitted to the
Japanese government a Proposal on Regulation of Foreign Legal Consultants in Japan, sec-
tion 4 of which contained a reciprocity provision patterned on the corresponding provision
in the D.C. Rule. See note 23 and accompanying text.
64 Resolution Adopted by an Extraordinary General Meeting of Nichibenren, Approval
of the Basic Policy for a "Foreign Lawyers" System (December 9, 1985) ("Nichibenren Res-
olution") (copy on file with the University of Chicago Legal Forum).




68 Nichibenren Resolution (cited in note 64).
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Foreign Lawyers" 69-a law which is to be put into effect by de-
tailed implementing regulations. 70 The new Tokyo rules promise to
be far less liberal than the provisions governing foreign lawyers in
New York, London, Paris or Brussels. Thus, a New York lawyer in
Tokyo might generally be restricted to advising on New York
law; 7' would be forbidden to employ or enter into partnership with
a member of the Japanese Bar;72 could not appear before any
"public agency" in Japan;73 would be subject to the rules of the
Japanese Bar, which each applicant would be obligated to join, but
which could reject any application deemed "inappropriate"; 74
could not use the name of his law firm except as "an annex" to his
own name and the name of any other licensed foreign lawyer in the
same Tokyo office;75 would be obligated to be "physically present"
in Japan at least 180 days each year;76 and would be punishable
not only by professional discipline,77 but also by "imprisonment at
hard labor for up to two years or a fine of up to one million yen" in
the event of a violation of the rules governing foreign lawyers in
Japan.78
There is, moreover, a major potential obstacle imbedded in the
Nichibenren resolution and carried forward in the Japanese Law
on Foreign Lawyers. The resolution calls for a system "based on
reciprocity," and Article 1 of the Law requires "guarantees of reci-
procity." Although the Law does not attempt to define "reciproc-
ity" as applied to the United States, under the very first section of
the resolution Japan's reciprocity standard for the United States
would require "a substantial number of the major [U.S.] states" to
have "systems" for licensing bengoshi without examination; once
the United States as a whole was deemed to have met this test,
American lawyers "qualified" in states having such "systems"
would be eligible for licensing in Japan. 9
'9 Japanese Law No. 66 (May 23, 1986) (copy of draft translation provided by Milbank,
Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, on file with the University of Chicago Legal Forum).
70 Id. at art. 62.
" Id. at arts. 2.0.2, 2.0.4, 3.1. The question of scope of practice as well as questions
bearing on the size of foreign law offices in Japan are understood by the author to be under
continuing discussions between the Japanese and U.S. governments.
72 Id. at art. 49.
71 Id. at art. 3.1.1.
7' Id. at arts. 26, 42.
76 Id. at arts. 45.2, 47.2.
70 Id. at art. 48.1.
7 Id. at art. 52.
78 Id. at arts 63-68.
79 Nichibenren Resolution (cited in note 64).
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While this proposed reciprocity requirement may have been
intended as a device for indefinitely excluding American law firms
from Japan, it seems likely that the legal consultant rules which
exist in New York, the District of Columbia, Michigan and Hawaii
and which have been proposed in California"0 will produce a more
accommodating position on the part of Japan. Regardless of Ja-
pan's intentions in this regard, the United States government
seems committed to obtaining concessions from Japan on the issue
of reciprocity.
CONCLUSION
What is the significance of the U.S. government's willingness
to play such an active role in the development of policy governing
American lawyers' access to Japan? Is this willingness merely an
isolated departure from the U.S. rejection, discussed above, of "a
general approach to visa or professional practice problems?" 8' Or
is the United States now embarked upon a wide-ranging campaign
of promoting its "legal service industry" overseas? The available
information points to the former interpretation, particularly when
one considers the reaction of the USTR to the basic Nichibenren
resolution of December 1985,82 a reaction suggesting governmental
frustration and disappointment over the results of "trade" negotia-
tions aimed at assisting the "legal service industry." Except for the
unique case of Japan, the United States government may have lit-
tle interest in the balance-of-trade implications of the marginal
and fractious activities of America's law firms, and may not em-
brace the American legal profession quite so energetically when
other international legal centers are at issue.
Moreover, as discussed above," it was the confluence of
unique considerations regarding Japan's geography, the recent his-
tory of its regulation of both foreign and domestic lawyers, and the
peculiarities of the U.S. trading relationship with Japan which
caused the U.S. to pursue the issue of trade in legal services with
Japan. Analogous considerations are unlikely to prove compelling
in respect of the U.S. trading relationship with any other country.
0 The Proposed California Rule regarding legal consultants, if adopted, would provide
for the licensing without examination of legal consultants authorized to conduct a consulting
practice in California. The legal consultants could not advise on the laws of countries other
than their home countries. California Proposal, at Rule 988(o)(5) (cited in note 21). The
proposed rule does not contain any requirement of reciprocity.
" See note 41 and accompanying text.
81 See notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
See text at notes 61-78.
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It is of course possible that Japan will not be treated as
unique, and that the efforts by the United States government to
"open up" that country to foreign lawyers will be deemed a model
for future government activity on behalf of the American legal pro-
fession. Viewed in the light of the critical issues of reciprocity and
applicable law,84 however, such a development could be unfortu-
nate, for the precedent of Japan may be a precedent based on nar-
row professional restrictions. The Japanese approach to these two
issues does not seem designed to liberalize transactions in legal ser-
vices: foreign law offices in Japan may be prohibited from advising
on local law or associating with members of the Japanese Bar; 5
and American law firms seeking to establish offices in Japan may
be confronted with barriers erected in the name of reciprocity.86
Such prohibitions and barriers would be unhappy precedents, and
it therefore might be prudent to concede the uniqueness of Japan
to fortuity.
Even so, it is conceivable that out of this fortuity major-and
sound-economic policy could develop. The United States govern-
ment seems committed to the liberalization of international trade
in services, meaning not legal services but certain major activities
like banking, insurance, communications, data processing, engi-
neering, and transportation.8 7 A concession by Japan over transac-
tions in legal services, viewed alone, might be of minor significance.
Yet these concessions could be parlayed by the United States into
support for its position in trade negotiations involving other, more
significant sectors of the service economy, where the stakes could
be high indeed. If this is the ultimate outcome, the American legal
profession might, willy-nilly, have rendered the country a truly
beneficial service.
" See text at notes 20-40.
" See text at notes 79-80. In adopting a prohibition against advising on local law, the
California Proposal of August 23, 1986 mirrors the narrowness of the Japanese Law of May
23, 1986. See discussion in note 80.
See text at notes 70-71.
87 See U.S. Study at 3, 54-57 (cited in note 35); Spero, 16 PS 17 (cited in note 39). As
one author has noted, this commitment is relatively recent. See, Ronald Kent Shelp, Beyond
Industrialization: Ascendancy of the Global Service Economy 75-77 (1981).

